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Abstract
We consider a principal-agent relationship where a buyer contracts with a risk-averse
supplier for the production of certain good. At the time of contracting, both parties
share incomplete information on cost of production. However, after contracting and before
production, the supplier privately discovers its cost of production. We study the optimal
contract between the two parties in the presence of cost uncertainty when the supplier is
privately informed of its risk preference at the time of contracting.
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1 Introduction
It is well understood that principal-agent relationships often involve simultaneous consider-
ation of risk sharing, eﬀort motivation (moral hazard), and information revelation (adverse
selection). For example, Zeckhauser (1970), Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Holmstrom
(1979), Shavell (1979); Grossman and Hart (1983) among others consider optimal risk
sharing under moral hazard; Salanie (1990) studies optimal risk sharing under adverse
selection; Laﬀont and Rochet (1998), Theilen (2003), and Dai (2007) study optimal risk
sharing under both adverse selection and moral hazard. In all these studies, the equilibrium
contracts closely depend on both the principal’s and the agent’s degree of risk aversion.
In reality, principals often do not have precise information on agents’ risk preference. For
example, the owner of a firm typically does not know either a manager’s or a worker’s degree
of risk aversion. Similarly, a regulator seldom has perfect information on how risk-averse a
firm is. In those cases, the agent conceivably can manipulate the principal’s perception of
his risk preference. The purpose of this study is to extend the adverse selection model to
settings where the agent is privately informed about his degree of risk aversion.
We consider a principal-agent relationship where a buyer contracts with a risk-averse
supplier for the production of certain good. At the time of contracting, both the buyer and
the supplier share the same incomplete information about cost of production. However,
after signing the contract and before the production, the supplier can privately discover the
cost of production. We study the optimal contract between the two parties in the presence
of cost uncertainty when the supplier is privately informed of its risk preference at the time
of contracting.
When both parties share the same information on cost of production at the time of
contracting, the eﬃcient supply schedule can be achieved by a fixed-price contract which
makes the supplier the residual claimant of the production, if the supplier is risk-neutral.
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However, when the supplier is risk-averse, the optimal supply schedule must balance risk
sharing and the incentive for the supplier to truthfully reveal its private information on cost
of production. Consequently, a supplier of small degree of risk aversion supplies less than
the eﬃcient level of output except for the lowest and the highest realizations of the cost.
The production distortion increases as the supplier becomes more risk-averse. When the
supplier becomes suﬃciently risk-averse, bunching arises in the supply schedule—the supplier
is required to produce a constant level of output for high realizations of cost. When the
supplier becomes infinitely risk-averse, the supply schedule converges to one where the
supplier is privately informed about its cost of production at the time of contracting.
When the supplier is privately informed of its degree of risk aversion, the buyer must
screen the supplier not only by its marginal cost of production but also by its degree of risk
aversion. When the buyer is risk-neutral, the optimal contract balances risk sharing and
the incentive for the supplier to truthfully reveal both the realization of cost and its degree
of risk aversion. Consequently, the supply schedule for the more risk-averse supplier is
further distorted towards a cost-plus contract in order to limit a less risk-averse supplier’s
incentive to mimick a more risk-averse one. However, the supply schedule for the less
risk-averse supplier is the same as when the supplier’s degree of risk aversion is common
information.
When the buyer is also risk-averse, the optimal contract must simultaneously balance
the buyer’s profits with diﬀerent types of suppliers, risk sharing between the two parties
and the supplier’s incentives for truthful information revelation. The downward distortion
in production decreases for both types of suppliers as a risk-averse buyer allocates more risk
towards the suppliers. Moreover, a risk-averse buyer also reduces the production distortion
for a more risk-averse supplier to smooth its profits with diﬀerent types of suppliers. When
the buyer is suﬃciently risk-averse, both types of suppliers produce above the eﬃcient level
of output.
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de Mezza and Webb (2000) and Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (2007) study the optimal
insurance contracts under moral hazard when insurance customers are privately informed
of their risk preference. Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) consider a principal-agent set-
ting with one risk neutral monopolistic insurer and one risk-averse agent who is privately
informed about his degree of risk aversion. Smart (2000) studies a screening game in a
competitive insurance market in which insurance customers diﬀer with respect to both ac-
cident probability and degree of risk aversion. In contrast to the above studies, we consider
a principal-agent relationship where suppliers diﬀer with respect to both cost of production
and degree of risk aversion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the central elements
of the model. As a benchmark, Section 3 presents the optimal contract when the supplier’s
degree of risk aversion is common information. Section 4 examines the optimal contract
when the supplier is privately informed of its degree of risk aversion. Section 5 summarizes
our main findings and concludes the paper with future research directions. The proofs of
all formal conclusions are in the Appendix.
2 The model
A buyer contracts with a supplier to obtain some quantity, q ≥ 0, of a good. The buyer’s
valuation of q is V (q), and V (·) is a smooth, increasing, and concave function. The buyer’s
net surplus is W = V (q) − T , where T is the buyer’s payment to the supplier. The
supplier’s total cost of producing q is C = cq, where c is the supplier’s marginal/average
cost of production. Hence, the supplier’s profit is π = T − cq.
The utility function of the supplier, U(·), belongs to some smooth one-dimensional
family of utility functions that is ranked according to the Arrow-Prat measure of risk
aversion: for any wealth level π, −U 0(ρ, π)/U 00(ρ, π) is increasing with ρ. Thus, ρ measures
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the the supplier’s degree of risk aversion. The supplier’s degree of risk aversion is unknown
to the buyer. However, it is common knowledge that the supplier’s degree of risk aversion,
ρ, belongs to the two point support {ρl, ρh} with ρh > ρl and Pr(ρ = ρl) = α (therefore
Pr(ρ = ρh) = 1− α).
The supplier’s marginal cost of production, c, is uncertain at the time of contracting.
However, both the buyer and the supplier know that the realization of c follows a uniform
distribution between c and c. After contracting with the buyer and before the production
takes place, the supplier privately discovers the realization of c.
The timing and contractual relation between the buyer and the supplier are as follows:
(1) the supplier privately learns its degree of risk aversion ρ; (2) the buyer oﬀers the supplier
a set of contract menus Mn = {Tn(c), qn(c)} conditional on the supplier’s degree of risk
aversion n, where n = l, h, and its eventual marginal cost c; (3) the supplier selects its
preferred menu Mn given its private information on ρ; (4) the supplier discovers c, and
selects a desired option (Tn(c), qn(c)) from the selected menu Mn; (5) exchange takes place
according to the contract terms.
3 Common Information on Risk Preference
As a benchmark, in this section we discuss the optimal contract when the supplier’s degree
of risk aversion is common information. When the buyer is risk-neutral, its optimization
problem is choosing {T (c), q(c)} to maximize
Z c
c
[V (q(c))− T (c)]f(c)dc, (1)
where f(c) is the probability density function of c. Denote ∆c = c− c, then f(c) = 1/∆c.
A contract is feasible (or implementable) provided if it is incentive compatible and
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individually rational. Incentive compatibility requires that the contract induces the supplier
to truthfully report its realization of marginal cost, i.e.,
π(ci | ci) > π(ci | cj) for ci 6= cj, (2)
where π(ci | ci) and π(ci | cj) denote the supplier’s respective profits from choosing options
(T (ci), q(ci)) and (T (cj), q(cj)) when the realization of its marginal cost in fact is ci. In-
dividual rationality requires that the supplier’s expected utility from entering the contract
must be nonnegative, i.e.,
E[U ] =
Z c
c
U(T (c)− cq(c))f(c)dc > 0. (3)
When the supplier is risk-neutral, it is well known that the optimal contract {T (c), q(c)}
takes the following form:
T (c) = V (q(c))− T , where (4)
T = argmax
q(c)
Z c
c
[V (q(c))− cq(c)]f(c)dc. (5)
The optimal contract in essence makes the supplier the residual claimant of its production.
Under the contract, the supplier produces the eﬃcient amount of goods (i.e., V 0(q(c)) = c,)
based on the realization of its marginal cost. Moreover, the supplier receives zero rent in
expectation as E[U ] =Max
q(c)
R c
c [(V (q(c))− T )− cq(c)]f(c)dc = 0 under the contract.
Under the above optimal contract, the supplier bears the entire risk of cost uncertainty
as the residual claimant of the production. When the supplier is risk-averse, however, the
optimal contract must balance risk sharing and the incentive for the supplier to truthfully
reveal its marginal cost of production.
Lemma 1 describes the general properties of the optimal contract when the supplier’s
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degree of risk aversion is common information.
Lemma 1 The optimal contract must be of the following form, for some c∗ in [c, c] and
q∗ > 0:
(a) E[U ] = 1∆c
R c
c U(π(c))dc = 0;
(b) q(c) is given by
1
∆c
[V 0(q(c))− c] = c− c
∆c
−
R c
c U
0(π(x))dF (x)R c
c U
0(π(x))dF (x)
(6)
on [c, c∗) and q(c) = q∗ on [c∗, c].
Proof. See appendix.
At the time of contracting both the supplier and the buyer face the same uncertainty
regarding the cost of production. Consequently, although the supplier can capture informa-
tion rent from its private information on the realization of c after signing the contract, the
buyer can fully extract the expected information rent at the time of contracting by reducing
the level of transfer payments T (c) for all realization of c. (Note that it is the diﬀerence
in T (c) that provides the incentive for the supplier to truthfully reveal its marginal cost.)
Consequently, the supplier receives zero expected utility under the optimal contract.
Given that the buyer can fully extract the supplier’s ex post information rent at the
time of contracting, the buyer does not face the traditional trade-oﬀ between rent extraction
and production eﬃciency as in Baron and Myerson (1982). As we have shown earlier, the
supplier’s ex post information rent would be costless to the buyer and the eﬃcient outcome
would be achieved if the supplier were risk-neutral. However, when the supplier is risk-
averse, the optimal supply schedule must balance risk sharing and the incentive for truthful
information revelation. Equation (6) demonstrates the intuition.
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When the supplier’s realization of marginal cost is bc, raising q(bc) by δq will in expecta-
tion increase the supplier’s production eﬃciency by [V 0(q(bc))− bc]δq/∆c where 1/∆c is the
probability that c = bc. However, the increase in q(bc) will also raise the supplier’s ex post
information rent by δq when c < bc. Consequently, in expectation the increase in q(bc) raises
the supplier’s ex post information rent by (c− c)δq/∆c, where (c− c)/∆c is the probability
that c < bc. When the supplier is risk-averse, the buyer can only reduce T (c) for all realiza-
tion of c by δq
R c
c U
0(π(x))dx/
R c
c U
0(π(x))dx in order to keep the supplier’s expected utility
unchanged. Notice that δq
R c
c U
0(π(x))dx is the increase in the supplier’s expected utility
as a result of the increased ex post information rent, and
R c
c U
0(π(x))dx is the supplier’s
additional expected utility as a result of one unit of increase in T (c) for all realization of
c. Therefore, δq
R c
c U
0(π(x))dx/
R c
c U
0(π(x))dx is the certainty equivalent of the supplier’s
increased additional information rent. At the optimum, the supplier’s marginal benefit of
raising q(bc) must equal its marginal cost of doing so, which yields equation (6).
When the supplier is risk-neutral, i.e., u00 = 0,
R c
c U
0(π(x))dx/
R c
c U
0(π(x))dx = (c −
c)/∆c, which means the the certainty equivalent of the supplier’s increased additional
information rent is the same for both the buyer and the seller. Consequently, the buyer
can fully extract the supplier’s expected ex post information rent by reducing the transfer
payments under all realization of c by exactly (c− c)/∆c. In that case, the right-hand side
of equation (6) becomes zero, and V 0(q(c)) = c. The optimal contract would be a fixed
price contract, and the supplier would always supply the eﬃcient level of goods.
Denote the term on the left-hand side of equation (6) as D(c). When the optimal supply
schedule is strictly decreasing in c in [c, c], i.e., c∗ = c (no bunching), equation (6) suggests
that D(c) = 0 and V 0(q(c)) = c at c and c. Therefore, the supplier delivers the eﬃcient
amount of goods at c and c. Furthermore, D00(c) = U 00(π(c))q(c)/
R c
c U
0(π(x))dx < 0, which
implies that D(c) is concave on (c, c). Since D(c) = D(c) = 0, the concavity suggests that
D(c) > 0 on (c, c). Consequently, the supplier delivers less than the eﬃcient amount of
goods on (c, c).
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To fully demonstrate the eﬀect of risk aversion on the optimal contract, we assume that
the supplier has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function, u(x) = 1−e−ρx
with ρ > 0 and the buyer have a quadratic value function, V (q) = aq− bq2, with a > c > 0
and b > 0.1
Lemma 2 demonstrates the eﬀect of risk aversion on the optimal supply schedule in the
no-bunching region.
Lemma 2 When there is no bunching, the supply schedule, q(c), decreases with the sup-
plier’s degree of risk aversion, ρ, on (c, c).
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 suggests that, when the supplier becomes more risk-averse, the buyer opti-
mally reduces the supplier’s exposure to cost uncertainty by distorting the supply schedule
on (c, c) downwards. As ρ becomes increasingly large, the monotonicity condition that re-
quires q0(c) 6 0– a necessary condition for the supplier to truthfully reveal its realization
of marginal cost – may become constraining. Consequently, the optimal supply schedule
may involve bunching as the buyer becomes suﬃciently risk-averse.
Lemma 3 fully characterizes the eﬀect of the supplier’s degree of risk aversion on the
optimal contract.
Lemma 3 There exists ρ∗ with ρ∗ > 0, such that
(a) For ρ < ρ∗, there is no bunching and q(c) is given by
1
∆c
[V 0(q(c))− c] = c− c
∆c
−
R c
c e
−ρπdxR c
c e
−ρπdx
(7)
1Technically, our analysis in this case is similar to Salanie (1990) where a risk-neutral producer contracts
with a risk-averse retailer.
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for all c on [c, c];
(b) For ρ > ρ∗, q(c) is given by equation (7) on some interval [c, c∗) and is constant on
[c∗, c].
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 suggests that bunching arises in the optimal contract when the supplier be-
comes suﬃciently risk-averse. In the optimal contract, the supply schedule is strictly de-
creasing in the realization of marginal cost for small value of marginal cost but is constant
for all realizations of marginal cost above c∗ whose value depends on ρ.
 q 
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Figure 1. The comparative statics of the second-best supply schedule as ρ increases.
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Notice that when the supplier is infinitely risk-averse, i.e., ρ converges to infinity, equa-
tion (7) becomes
1
∆c
[V 0(q(c))− c] = c− c
∆c
. (8)
It is the well known solution for a standard adverse selection problem where the supplier is
privately informed about its marginal cost of production at the time of contracting. This
is because the supplier will participate in the contract only if he is guaranteed nonnegative
profit for all realization of c when he is infinitely risk-averse. Consequently our model
becomes equivalent to one that the supplier is perfectly informed about its marginal cost
at the time of contracting.
For later use, we call the optimal supply schedule when the supplier’s degree of risk
aversion is common information the second-best supply schedule.
4 Asymmetric Information on Risk Preference
4.1 A Risk-Neutral Buyer
When the supplier is privately informed of its degree of risk aversion, the buyer must
screen the supplier not only by its marginal cost of production but also by its degree of
risk aversion.
When the buyer is risk-neutral, the buyer’s optimization problem is choosing a set of
contract menus Mn = {Tn(c), qn(c)} for n = l, h to maximize
Z c
c
{α[V (ql(c))− Tl(c)] + (1− α)[V (qh(c))− Th(c)]} f(c)dc, (9)
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subject to
E[U(ρn,Mn)] =
Z c
c
U(Tn(c)− cqn(c))f(c)dc > 0; (10)
πn(ci | ci) > πn(ci | cj) for ci 6= cj; and (11)
E[U(ρn,Mn)] > E[U(ρs,Ms)], (12)
where n = l, h , s = l, h, and n 6= s.
While conditions (10) and (11) ensure the supplier’s participation and truthful report
of its marginal cost regardless of its degree of risk aversion, condition (12) guarantees that
the supplier truthfully reveals its degree of risk aversion.
Proposition 1 describes the general properties of the optimal contract when the supplier
is privately informed of its degree of risk aversion.
Proposition 1 The optimal contract has the following properties :
(a) E[U(ρl,Ml)] > E[U(ρh,Mh)] = 0;
(b) In no bunching region, the optimal supply schedule for the less risk-averse supplier
is characterized by
1
∆c
[V 0(ql(c))− c] =
Z c
c
(
1
∆c
− e
−ρlπlR c
c e
−ρlπldx
)
dz; and (13)
the optimal supply schedule for the more risk-averse supplier is characterized by
1− α
∆c
[V 0(qh(c))− c] =
Z c
c
{1− α
∆c
− e
−ρhπhR c
c e
−ρhπhdx
+
αe−ρlπhR c
c e
−ρlπldx
}dz. (14)
Proof. See Appendix.
Under the optimal contract, the buyer can fully extract the more risk-averse supplier’s
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ex post information rent by adjusting the level of payments for all realizations of marginal
cost as in the case of common information on risk aversion. However, the utility function of
a less risk-averse supplier is an increasing and convex transformation of that of a more risk-
averse supplier, and in equilibrium the less risk-averse supplier can enjoy positive expected
utility by mimicking a more risk-averse one. Consequently, the optimal contract provides
a less risk-averse supplier positive expected utility to induce its truthful revelation of its
degree of risk aversion.
Under the optimal contract, the supply schedule for the less risk-averse supplier opti-
mally balances risk sharing and the incentive for the supplier to truthfully reveal its realiza-
tion of marginal cost, as in the case of common information on risk aversion. Consequently,
the less risk-averse supplier produces according to the second-best supply schedule.
However, the supply schedule for the more risk-averse supplier now must simultaneously
trade-oﬀ risk sharing, the supplier’s incentives to truthfully reveal its marginal cost of
production, and the less risk-averse supplier’s incentive to truthfully reveal its degree of
risk aversion. To demonstrate the trade-oﬀ, we rewrite equation (14) as
1− α
∆c
[V 0(qh(c))− c] = (1− α)[
(c− c)
∆c
−
R c
c e
−ρhπhdzR c
c e
−ρhπhdx
] + αG(c), (15)
where G(c) ≡
R c
c e
−ρlπhdz/
R c
c e
−ρlπldx−
R c
c e
−ρhπhdz/
R c
c e
−ρhπhdx.
When the more risk-averse supplier’s realization of marginal cost is bc, raising qh(bc)
by δq will in expectation increase the production eﬃciency by (1− α)[V 0(q(bc)) − bc]δq/∆c
where 1 − α is probability that the supplier is more risk-averse. However, the increase in
qh(bc) will also raise the more risk-averse supplier’s ex post information rent by δq when
c < bc. Consequently, in expectation it increases the more risk-averse supplier’s ex post
information rent by δq
R c
c e
−ρhπhdz. In addition, the increase in qh(bc) will also increase the
less risk-averse supplier’s rent from mimicking the more risk-averse one by δq
R c
c e
−ρlπhdz
12
in expectation.
The certainty equivalents of the above ex post information rents for both types of sup-
pliers are δq
R c
c e
−ρhπhdz/
R c
c e
−ρhπhdx and δq
R c
c e
−ρlπhdz/
R c
c e
−ρlπldx, respectively. Notice
that
R c
c e
−ρhπhdx and
R c
c e
−ρlπldx are the marginal utilities of one unit of increase in certainty
equivalent for both types of suppliers, respectively.
In anticipation of the supplier’s information rent, at the time of contracting the buyer
can reduce both types of suppliers’ payments by δq
R c
c e
−ρhπhdz/
R c
c e
−ρhπhdx for all real-
izations of marginal cost. Doing so fully extracts the more risk-averse supplier’s ex post
information rent and provides the less risk-averse supplier just enough incentive to truth-
fully reveal its degree of risk aversion. At the optimum, the supplier’s marginal benefit of
raising qh(bc) must equal its marginal cost of doing so, which yields equation (15).
Notice that αG(c) (which is positive on (c, c) as shown in the proof of Proposition 2)
is the eﬀect of asymmetric information on the supplier’s risk aversion. In order to limit a
less risk-averse supplier’s rent of exaggerating its degree of risk aversion, the buyer further
distorts the more risk-averse supplier’s contract towards a cost-plus contract. Consequently,
as we show in Proposition 2, the more risk-averse supplier produces below the second-best
supply schedule.
Proposition 2 Under the optimal contract, the more risk-averse supplier’s supply schedule
is below the second-best level.
Proof. See Appendix.
Similar to the case of common information on risk aversion, bunching arises in the
optimal contract as either type of supplier becomes increasingly risk-averse. In the optimal
contract with bunching, the supply schedule is strictly decreasing in the realization of
marginal cost for small value of marginal cost but is constant for all realizations of marginal
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cost above certain critical value of marginal cost. The critical value of marginal cost depends
on the degree of risk aversion of both types of suppliers.
Proposition 3 describes the properties of the optimal contract in that case.
Proposition 3 When both types of suppliers become suﬃciently risk-averse, there exist
some c∗h and c
∗
l in [c, c] that the optimal supply schedule is constant over [c
∗
h, c] for the more
risk-averse supplier and [c∗l , c] for the less risk-averse supplier; The supply schedules for
the non-bunching regions are determined by equation (14) for the more risk-averse supplier
and by equation (13) for the less risk-averse supplier.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3 and is therefore omitted.
Suppose that one type of supplier is risk-neutral and the other type of supplier is
infinitely risk-averse. Then equation (15) becomes
1− α
∆c
[V 0(qh(c))− c] =
c− c
∆c
. (16)
A direct comparison between equations (8) and (16) demonstrates the eﬀect on the
optimal contract of asymmetric information on the supplier’s risk aversion. An increase in
qh(bc) by δq increases the more risk-averse suppliers’ production eﬃciency by [V 0(q(bc)) −bc]δq/∆c regardless whether he is privately informed about its risk aversion. However, with
asymmetric information on risk aversion, an increase in qh(bc) by δq increases the ex post
information rent for not only the more risk-averse supplier but also the less risk-averse
supplier by (c − c)/∆c. The certainty equivalent of the ex post information rent is zero
for the more risk-averse supplier, which means that the buyer cannot extract any of the ex
post rent at the time of contracting. Consequently, with asymmetric information on risk
aversion, the more risk-averse supplier’s supply schedule is further distorted towards a cost
plus contract.
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4.2 A Risk-Averse Buyer
When the buyer is also risk-averse, the optimal contract must balance the buyer’s profits
with diﬀerent types of suppliers, in addition to the tradeoﬀ among risk sharing and the
incentives for the supplier to truthfully reveal both its marginal cost of production and
its degree of risk aversion. Suppose that the buyer has a constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) utility function, u(x) = 1− e−ρbx with ρb > 0. The buyer’s optimization problem
is choosing a set of contract menus Mn = {Tn(c), qn(c)} for n = l, h to maximize
E[Ub] =
Z c
c
©
α[1− e−ρbWl] + (1− α)[1− e−ρbWh]
ª
f(c)dc (17)
subject to conditions (10), (11), and (12), whereWl = V (ql(c))−Tl(c) andWh = V (qh(c))−
Th(c).
Proposition 4 describes the properties of the optimal contract when both the buyer and
the supplier are risk-averse.
Proposition 4 When both the buyer and the supplier are risk-averse, the optimal contract
has the following properties:
(a) E[U(ρl,Ml)] > E[U(ρh,Mh)] = 0;
(b) In no bunching region, the optimal supply schedule for the less risk-averse supplier
is characterized by
e−ρbWl
CE
[V 0(ql(c))− c] =
Z c
c
(
e−ρbWl
CE
−
e−ρlπl
R c
c e
−ρbWldx
CE
R c
c e
−ρlπldx
)
dz; (18)
and the optimal optimal supply schedule for the more risk-averse supplier is characterized
15
by
(1− α)e−ρbWh
CE
[V 0(qh(c))−c] =
Z c
c
{(1− α)e
−ρbWh
CE
+
αe−ρlπh
R c
c e
−ρbWldx
CE
R c
c e
−ρlπldx
− e
−ρhπhR c
c e
−ρhπhdx
}dz,
(19)
where CE ≡ α
R c
c e
−ρbWldx+ (1− α)
R c
c e
−ρbWhdx.
Proof. See Appendix.
Under the optimal contract, the more risk-averse supplier still receives zero expected
utility, and the less risk-averse supplier still receives positive expected utility due to its
private information on its degree of risk aversion. However, the optimal supply schedule is
profoundly diﬀerent compared with the case when the buyer is risk neutral.
For the less risk-averse supplier, when the realization of marginal cost is bc, raising ql(bc)
by δq will in expectation increase W (bc) by [V 0(ql(bc)) − bc]δq which increases the buyer’s
certainty equivalent by δqα[V 0(ql(bc)) − bc]e−ρbW/CE. Note that CE is the increase in the
buyer’s expected surplus as a result of one unit increase in its profits for all possible events.
On the other hand, the increase in ql(bc) will also raise the less risk-averse supplier’s ex
post information rent by δq when c < bc. The certainty equivalent of the additional ex
post information rent is δq
R c
c e
−ρhπhdz/
R c
c e
−ρhπhdx for the supplier. Therefore, therefore
at the time of contracting the buyer can optimally reduce the supplier’s payments under
all realization of c by δq
R c
c e
−ρhπhdz/
R c
c e
−ρhπhdx.
However, the buyer’s certainty equivalent of the supplier’s additional ex post information
rent is δqα
R c
c e
−ρbWldz/CE and its certainty equivalent of the amount that can be extracted
from the supplier at the time of contracting is δqα
R c
c e
−ρlπldz
R c
c e
−ρbWldx/CE
R c
c e
−ρlπldx.
Hence depending on the relative sizes of these two certainty equivalents for the buyer, which
in turn depends on the relative degree of risk aversion between the two parties, the optimal
supply schedule can be either above or below the eﬃcient level.
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For example, when ρl converges to zero, i.e., the supplier converges to risk-neutral,R c
c e
−ρlπldx/
R c
c e
−ρlπldx converges to (c−c)/∆c and the latter certainty equivalent converges
to δqα(c − c)
R c
c e
−ρbWldx/(CE)∆c. In the optimal contract, Wl must be non-increasing
on [c, c]. Then, we have (c − c)
R c
c e
−ρbWldx/∆c >
R c
c e
−ρbWldz and the right-hand side of
equation (18) is non-positive. Consequently, the optimal supply schedule is above or at the
eﬃcient level on [c, c].
On the other hand, based on our analysis of a risk-neutral buyer in the previous section,
by continuity the optimal supply schedule must be below the eﬃcient level when the buyer
converges to risk-neutral.
The buyer’s risk aversion has a diﬀerent impact on the more risk-averse supplier’s supply
schedule. Equation (19) demonstrates how the optimal supply schedule for the more risk-
averse supplier balances risk sharing, incentives for truthful revelation, and the buyer’s
profits with diﬀerent types of suppliers.
The certainty equivalent of the additional profits of increasing qh(c) by δq is (1 −
α)[V 0(qh(c))−c]e−ρbWh/CE. However, the increase in qh(c) also increases the ex post infor-
mation rent for both types of suppliers. The certainty equivalent for the buyer of the more
risk-averse supplier’s additional ex post information rent is (1−α)δq
R c
c e
−ρbWhdz/CE. We
have shown earlier that the less risk-averse supplier’s certainty equivalent of the additional
ex post information rent is δq
R c
c e
−ρlπhdz/
R c
c e
−ρlπldx, the certainty equivalent of which for
the buyer is αδq
R c
c e
−ρlπhdz
R c
c e
−ρbWldx/CE
R c
c e
−ρlπldx. Note that α
R c
c e
−ρbWldx/CE is the
certainty equivalent for the buyer of one unit increase in surplus under a less risk-averse
supplier for all realizations of marginal costs. Therefore, it measures how the risk-averse
buyer values additional surplus under the less-risk averse supplier.
Recall that, in anticipation of the additional ex post information rents for both types
of suppliers, the buyer can reduce both types of suppliers’ payments for all realizations of
marginal cost by the amount equal to the more risk-averse supplier’s certainty equivalent
17
of the additional rent. Therefore, as indicated by the right-hand of Equation (19), the
marginal cost of increasing qh(c) is the sum of the certainty equivalents for the buyer
of both types of suppliers’ additional rents (which are (1 − α)δq
R c
c e
−ρbWhdz/CE and
α
R c
c e
−ρlπhdz
R c
c e
−ρbWldx/CE
R c
c e
−ρlπldx, respectively) minus the more risk-averse supplier’s
certainty equivalent of the additional rent
R c
c e
−ρhπhdz/
R c
c e
−ρhπhdx. Nonetheless, the less
risk-averse supplier receives positive information rent from its private information on its
degree of risk aversion. Similar to the case of risk-neutral buyer, in order to restrict a
less risk-averse supplier’s rent of exaggerating its degree of risk aversion, the buyer distorts
the more risk-averse supplier’s contract towards a cost plus contract compared with the
contract for the less risk-averse supplier. However, the distortion is smaller compared with
the case of a risk-neutral buyer as the distortion for a more risk-averse supplier becomes
more costly and the information rent for a less risk-averse supplier becomes less important
to a risk-averse buyer.
It can be readily shown that the optimal supply schedule for a more risk-averse supplier
can also be either below or above the eﬃcient level depending on the relative degree of risk
aversion between the buyer and the supplier.
We summarize this property in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Depending on the relative degree of risk aversion between the buyer and
the supplier, the optimal supply schedule for both types of suppliers can be either below or
above the eﬃcient level.
5 Conclusion
We extend the standard adverse selection model to settings where the supplier is privately
informed of its degree of risk aversion. The optimal contract simultaneously balances
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risk sharing, incentives for information revelation, and the buyer’s expected profits with
diﬀerent types of suppliers. A supplier with small degree of risk aversion produces below
the eﬃcient levle of output le except for the lowest and the highest realizations of cost. The
production distortion increases as the supplier becomes more risk-averse. The asymmetric
information on risk preference further distorts the supply schedule of a more risk-averse
supplier towards a cost-plus contract. However, when the buyer is also risk-averse, both
types of supplier may produce above the eﬃcient supply schedule.
Our research could be extended in several directions. For example, although the sup-
plier’s information on cost of production is imperfect at the time of contracting, the supplier
could be better informed of its potential costs than the buyer. Then the optimal contract
must screen the firm not only by its degree of risk aversion but also by its information re-
garding cost of production at the time of contracting. The optimal contract in this situation
merits further investigation.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
A well known characterization of feasible contracts is the following: (a) T 0(c) = cq0(c); (b)
q(c) is non increasing; (c) EU ≥ 0.
Therefore, we can rewrite the buyer’s optimization problem as an optimal control prob-
lem with state variables T (c) and q(c) and control variable q0(c) = z:
Max
1
∆c
Z c
c
[V (q(c))− T (c)]dc, (A1)
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subject to
q0(c) = z (A2)
T 0(c) = cz (A3)
q0(c) ≤ 0; and (A4)
1
∆c
Z c
c
U(T (c)− cq(c))dc > 0. (A5)
The Hamiltonian is
H = [V (q)− T ] + μcz + λz + θU(π). (A6)
The necessary conditions are given by
∂H
∂z
= μc+ λ > 0, z 6 0, and (μc+ λ) z = 0; (A7)
λ0 = −∂H
∂q
= −[V 0(q)− θU 0(π)c]; (A8)
μ0 = −∂H
∂T
= −[−1 + θU 0(π)]; and (A9)
λ(c) = λ(c) = μ(c) = μ(c) = 0. (A10)
From the transversality condition (A8) and equation (A9),
μ(c)− μ(c) =
Z c
c
[1− θU 0(π)]dc = 0. (A11)
Therefore,
θ =
∆cR c
c U
0(π(c))dc
. (A12)
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Define h(c) = μc+λ. From condition (A7), on any interval where q is strictly decreasing,
h(c) must be zero. So h0(c) = μ+ μ0c+ λ0 = 0, which leads to
μ = −μ0c− λ0. (A13)
Substituting equations (A8) and (A9) into the above equation for μ0 and λ0, we have
μ =
Z c
c
[1− θU 0(π)]dx = V 0(q)− c. (A14)
Substituting equation (A12) into the above equation for θ, we have
1
∆c
[V 0(q)− c] = c− c
∆c
−
R c
c U
0(π(x))dxR c
c U
0(π(x))dx
. (A15)
Next we show that q0(c) = 0 can only occur on some interval [c∗, c], and the solution is
strictly decreasing on [c, c∗). Suppose that there exist c1, c2, and c3 such that q is constant
on (c1, c2) and strictly decreasing on (c2, c3).
Since q is constant on (c1, c2) on (c2, c3), h(c+2 ) = h0(c
+
2 ) = h00(c
+
2 ) = 0. Furthermore,
h0(c) = μ+ μ0c+ λ0 (A16)
=
Z c
c
[1− θU 0(π)]dx− [V 0(q)− c].
Hence,
0 = h
00
(c+2 ) = [1− θU 0(π(c+2 ))]− [V
00
(q(c+2 ))q
0(c+2 )− 1] (A17)
< 2− θU 0(π(c−2 )) = h
00
(c−2 ),
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as V 00(q(c+2 )) < 0, q0(c
+
2 ) < 0, and q0(c
−
2 ) = 0.
Moreover,
h000(c) = θU 00(π(c))q(c) < 0 (A18)
on (c1, c2), which together with (A17) implies that h00(c) is positive (i.e., h(c) is convex,) on
(c1, c2). Since h(c+2 ) = 0, h(c) is convex on (c1, c2) means h(c1) > 0. As h(c) is continuous,
it h(c) > 0 must be true for some c < c1. Since μ(c) = 0 by the transversality condition,
there is a contradiction.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
With CARA utility function, when there is no bunching, q(c) is given by equation (7)
for all c on [c, c]. Diﬀerentiating both sides of equation (7) with respect to c, we have
1− e−ρπ(c) = −2bq0(c)− 1 and q0(c) = (e−ρπ(c) − 2)/2b. Since π0(c) = −q(c),
π00(c) = −q0(c) = (2− e−ρπ(c))/2b. (A19)
Assume for some (ρ0, c0), A ≡ ∂q/∂ρ = −∂2π(c)/∂c∂ρ > 0. Since A(ρ0, c) = A(ρ0, c) =
0 and A(ρ0, ·) is smooth, A must admit an interior positive maximum on (c, c), i.e.,
A(ρ0, cm) > 0; (A20)
∂A(ρ0, cm)
∂c
= 0; and (A21)
∂2A(ρ0, cm)
∂c2
6 0. (A22)
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From equation (A17),
∂A(ρ0, cm)
∂c
= −∂
3π(cm)
∂c2∂ρ
= −e
−ρπ
2b
∂ρπ
∂ρ
; and (A23)
∂2A(ρ0, cm)
∂c2
= −∂
4π(cm)
∂c3∂ρ
= − 1
2b
[e−ρπρq
∂ρπ
∂ρ
+ e−ρπ
∂2(ρπ)
∂ρ∂c
]. (A24)
Equations (7) and (A21) together imply that ∂ρπ/∂ρ = 0 and
∂2A(ρ0, cm)
∂c2
= − 1
2b
e−ρπ
∂2(ρπ)
∂ρ∂c
. (A25)
Then equations (A22) and (A25) together require that
∂2(ρπ)
∂ρ∂c
= −∂ρq
∂ρ
= −(q + ρ∂q
∂ρ
) > 0. (A26)
Equation (A26) implies ∂q/∂ρ < 0, which contradicts with condition (A20).
6.3 Proof of Lemma 3
With CARA utility function, when there is no bunching, from equation (6) we have
1
∆c
[V 0(q(c))− c] = c− c
∆c
−
R c
c e
−ρπdxR c
c e
−ρπdx
(A27)
on [c, c].When ρ = 0, q(c) is strictly decreasing on [c, c]. By continuity, the optimal supply
schedule is strictly decreasing on [c, c] for small ρ.
With the quadratic value function, equation (A27) provides
q0(c) = (e−ρπ(c) − 2)/2b > −1/b; and (A28)
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q00(c) = e−ρπ(c)ρq/2b = (1 + bq0(c))ρq/b. (A29)
Therefore, q00(c) > 0, i.e., the supply schedule is strictly convex on [c, c] when there is
no bunching. Hence, the supply schedule will be non-increasing everywhere if and only if
∂q(c)/∂c 6 0. Suppose that ∂q(c)/∂c 6 0 for any ρ in the optimal contract.
Since q0(c) > −1/b, the graph of q must stay inside the triangle pictured in Figure 1.
Therefore, we have
Z c
c
q(c)dc >
a− c
2b
∆c+
b
2
[
(a− c)− (a− c)
2b
]2 =
∆c
2b
[a− c− ∆c
4
]. (A30)
Integrating both sides of equation (A29) with respect to c provides
q0(c)− q0(c) = ρ
b
Z c
c
(1 + bq0(c))q(c)dc
>
ρ
b
½
∆c
2b
(a− c− ∆c
4
) +
q2(c)− q2(c)
2
¾
>
ρ∆c
2b2
½
(a− c− ∆c
4
) +
2a− c− c
4
¾
. (A31)
The term on the left-hand side of inequality converges to infinity as ρ goes to infinity.
However, since 0 > q0(c) > −1/b, q0(c) − q0(c) < 1/b, which is contradict with condition
(A31).
Proposition 2 implies that ∂2q(c, ρ)/∂c∂ρ > 0. Therefore, there exists ρ∗ with ρ∗ > 0,
such that bunching occurs when ρ > ρ∗.
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6.4 Proof of Proposition 1
The Hamiltonian is
H = α[V (ql(c))− Tl(c)] + (1− α)[V (qh(c))− Th(c)] (A32)
+μlczl + μhczh + λlzl + λhzh − θe−ρhπh + β[e−ρlπh − e−ρlπl ], (A33)
where μl, μh, λl, λh, and β are the Lagrange multipliers.
The necessary conditions are given by
∂H
∂z
= μlc+ λl > 0, zl 6 0, and (μlc+ λl) zl = 0; (A34)
∂H
∂z
= μhc+ λh > 0, z 6 0, and (μhc+ λh) zl = 0; (A35)
λ0l = −
∂H
∂q
= −[αV 0(ql)− βe−ρlπlρlc]; (A36)
λ0h = −
∂H
∂q
= −[(1− α)V 0(qh)− θe−ρhπhρhc+ βe−ρlπhρlc]; (A37)
μ0l = −
∂H
∂T
= −[−α+ βe−ρlπlρl]; (A38)
μ0h = −
∂H
∂T
= −[−(1− α) + θe−ρhπhρh − βe−ρlπhρl]; and (A39)
λn(c) = λn(c) = μn(c) = μn(c) = 0, where n = l, h. (A40)
From the transversality condition (A40) and equation (A38),
μl(c)− μl(c) =
Z c
c
[α− βe−ρlπlρl]dc = 0, (A41)
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which provides
β =
α∆c
ρl
R c
c e
−ρlπldc
. (A42)
From the transversality condition (A40) and equation (A39),
μl(c)− μl(c) =
Z c
c
[(1− α)− θe−ρhπhρh + βe−ρlπhρl]dc = 0, (A43)
which provides
θ =
1
ρl
[(1− α) + α
R c
c e
−ρlπhdcR c
c e
−ρlπldc
] =
1
ρl
(A44)
as
R c
c e
−ρlπhdc =
R c
c e
−ρlπldc, i.e., constraint (15) is binding at equilibrium.
Since h0n(c) = μn + μ0nc+ λ
0
n = 0 or μl = −μ0lc− λ0l when qn is strictly decreasing in c,
we have
μl =
Z c
c
[α− α∆ce
−ρlπlR c
c e
−ρlπldx
]dz = α[V 0(ql(c))− c], (A45)
and
μh =
Z c
c
[(1− α)− θe−ρhπhρh + βe−ρlπhρl]dx (A46)
=
Z c
c
[(1− α)− e−ρhπh + α∆ce
−ρlπhR c
c e
−ρlπldz
]dx (A47)
= (1− α)[V 0(qh(c))− c]. (A48)
6.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Since
G0(c) =
e−ρlπhR c
c e
−ρlπhdc
− e
−ρhπhR c
c e
−ρhπhdc
, (A49)
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G0(c) > 0 if
πh >
ln
R c
c e
−ρlπhdc− ln
R c
c e
−ρhπhdc
ρh − ρl
. (A50)
Notice that ln
R c
c e
−ρlπhdc− ln
R c
c e
−ρhπhdc < 0 as
R c
c e
−ρlπhdc <
R c
c e
−ρhπhdc.
Since πh is strictly decreasing in c and
R c
c [1 − e−ρhπh]dc = 0, πh(c) must be positive.
Consequently, G0(c) > 0. Since πh is monotone in c, the sign of G0(c) can change at
most once. Moreover, since G(c) = G(c) = 0, the sign of G0(c) must change at least
once. Consequently, G(c) must be increasing for some region starting from c and become
decreasing for its complimentary region. As a result, G(c) > 0 on (c, c).
6.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The Hamiltonian is
H = α[1−e−ρbWl ]+(1−α)[1−e−ρbWh]+μlczl+μhczh+λlzl+λhzh−θe−ρhπh+β[e−ρlπh−e−ρlπl ],
(A51)
where μl, μh, λl, λh, and β are the Lagrange multipliers.
The necessary conditions are given by
∂H
∂z
= μlc+ λl > 0, zl 6 0, and (μlc+ λl) zl = 0; (A52)
∂H
∂z
= μhc+ λh > 0, z 6 0, and (μhc+ λh) zl = 0; (A53)
λ0l = −
∂H
∂ql
= −[αρbe−ρbWlV 0(ql)− βe−ρlπlρlc]; (A54)
λ0h = −
∂H
∂qh
= −[(1− α)ρbe−ρbWhV 0(qh)− θe−ρhπhρhc+ βe−ρlπhρlc]; (A55)
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μ0l = −
∂H
∂Tl
= −[−αρbe−ρbWl + βe−ρlπlρl]; (A56)
μ0h = −
∂H
∂Th
= −[−(1 + α)ρbe−ρbWh + θe−ρhπhρh − βe−ρlπhρl]; and (A57)
λn(c) = λn(c) = μn(c) = μn(c) = 0, where n = l, h. (A58)
From the transversality condition (A58) and equation (A56),
μl(c)− μl(c) =
Z c
c
[αρbe
−ρbWl − βρle−ρlπl ]dc = 0, (A59)
which provides
β =
αρb
R c
c e
−ρbWldc
ρl
R c
c e
−ρlπldc
. (A60)
From the transversality condition (A58) and equation (A57),
μh(c)− μh(c) =
Z c
c
[(1− α)ρbe−ρbWh − θe−ρhπhρh + βe−ρlπhρl]dc = 0, (A61)
which provides
θ =
αρb
R c
c e
−ρbWldc+ (1− α)ρb
R c
c e
−ρbWhdc
ρh
R c
c e
−ρhπhdc
. (A62)
Since μl = −μ0lc− λ0l when qn is strictly decreasing in c, we have
μl =
Z c
c
[αρbe
−ρbWl − βe−ρlπlρl]dz (A63)
=
Z c
c
[αρbe
−ρbWl −
αρb
R c
c e
−ρbWldcR c
c e
−ρlπldc
e−ρlπl ]dz (A64)
= αρbe
−ρbWl[V 0(ql(c))− c], (A65)
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and
μh =
Z c
c
[(1− α)ρbe−ρbWh − θe−ρhπhρh + βe−ρlπhρl]dx (A66)
=
Z c
c
[(1− α)ρbe−ρbWh −
CER c
c e
−ρlπldc
e−ρhπh +
αρb
R c
c e
−ρbWldcR c
c e
−ρlπldz
e−ρlπh]dx (A67)
= (1− α)ρbe−ρbWh[V 0(qh(c))− c]. (A68)
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